Counteroffensive at Moscow

Zhukov's plans

          The Soviets had the advantage after the winter due to the cold weather that led to the weakening and demoralization of the German troops. General Zhukov, who was in charge of the counteroffensive at Moscow, was critical in the planning and managing of the steps to victory. He believed that the counterattacks should be concentrated to the north of Moscow, where Soviet numerical superiority could drive and then encircle the enemy. It was necessary to destroy the major threats – Panzer Groups 3 and 4 – from the north. Zhukov also stressed the importance of not delaying the counteroffensive so that the Germans would have no chance of building defensible positions and gathering support from other fronts.

Surprise, surprise!

          Zhukov’s counteroffensive greatly surprised the German high command. For example, German intelligence only detected seven out of ten armies at Moscow, among the unknown were important ones such as the First Assault, Twentieth, and Tenth armies. Second of all, they had previously thought that the Soviets had no reserves, but they were mistaken once again.

Exposed German flanks

          The Germans based their offensive tactics on the premise that “decisive breakthrough, without fear of threats from the flanks, accomplishes the destruction of the enemy’s front”. Although this was successful in western European countries, the Soviet Union was a different matter. Because of its over-confidence and reliance on Blitzkrieg tactics, the German high command ignored the threats to their exposed flanks even while succeeding in punching through the enemy defences. This proved to be fatal to the German troops during Barbarossa and the Soviets gained the advantage.

German retreat

          The German armies were surrounded on 3 sides – from the northern Kalinin Front, the Western Front, and the southern Briansk front. Cooperation between Soviet armies led to the destruction of the German armies at Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra, and Tula.